There is little denying that the far-right is surging across the world and its resurgence has located Islamophobia as a core element of its contemporary doctrine, weaving a narrative that has spanned continents and cultures. While aptly noted in the study of white supremacy groups, less attention has been paid to the weaponization of anti-Muslim sentiment within Saffron nationalism in South Asia and Southeast Asia, particularly within Buddhist far-right groups in Myanmar and Sri Lanka.
These movements mobilize support through the use of hate spin and what can be termed “networked legitimacy.” They illustrate how far-right groups, despite geographic separation, create transnational echo chambers that sustain and spread hate, particularly targeting Muslim minorities. This global alignment underscores the wide-reaching influence of their narratives.
Hate Spin and Networked Legitimacy
Hate Spin as conceptualized by Professor Cherian George refers to a technique of mobilization that employs twin techniques of “hate speech (incitement through vilification) with manufactured offence-taking (the performance of righteous indignation)”. A narrative of persecution and victimhood is used to justify discrimination and galvanize their base toward an outpouring of hate and violence. In the contemporary context, it allows far-right groups to portray themselves as custodians of a threatened culture and mask their violence and hate speech as acts of self-defense against multiple conspiracies perpetuated by Muslims.
Networked legitimacy refers to a phenomenon where the success and increased virulence of one extremist movement lends credibility and influence and credence to similar movements in other spaces. It also explains how shared discourse—especially bigoted and discriminatory disinformation propagated by these groups—becomes legitimized and spread, particularly in online spaces. In this sense, networked legitimacy helps us understand how hate spin can be exported across borders.
Utilizing these two concepts enables us to understand how Islamophobia operates on a global scale. In Sri Lanka and Myanmar, local Buddhist far-right movements have tapped into global Islamophobic discourses, which in turn reinforce their narratives and actions. These movements don’t merely draw inspiration from one another—they actively contribute to a transnational network that amplifies their messages, creating a vicious cycle that sustains and spreads hate.
Saffron Nationalism and Islamophobia
In Sri Lanka, the rise of anti-Muslim sentiments has been heavily driven by Buddhist far-right groups who have leaned on global and regional Islamophobic narratives to craft a narrative that portrays Muslims as an existential threat to the Buddhist nation and way of life. This includes the portrayal of all Muslims as sleeper cells for Islamic extremist groups and borrowing from conspiracy theories like the great replacement theory in the West and “Love Jihad” from India to suggest the presence of a widespread conspiracy to replace Buddhists as the majority in Sri Lanka.
This was apparent in the 2018 violence against Muslims in the town of Ampara when disinformation was spread across social media platforms that Muslims who owned local eateries were mixing birth control medication into the food sold to Buddhist Sinhalese customers. The violence eventually spread and led to a 10-day state of emergency being declared across Sri Lanka.
Far-right groups in Sri Lanka, such as the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS), have found success by tapping into both global narratives while simultaneously localizing them to exploit the historical distrust of Muslims within the country. After the 2019 Easter bombings, these groups intensified their portrayal of Muslims as an existential threat to the Buddhist nation. This rhetoric is not just a product of local politics; it is part of a broader narrative that paints Islam as inherently violent and dangerous. By aligning themselves with this global discourse, Sri Lankan nationalists gain legitimacy and support, both domestically and internationally.
Far-right Buddhist nationalism has long been prevalent in Myanmar, most evidently seen through the persecution of the Rohingya Muslims. Far-right monk Ashin Wirathu and his 969 movement have engaged in extensive hate spin, referring to Muslims as “mad dogs” while emphasizing that Burmese Muslims pose an urgent threat to Buddhist values and culture in Myanmar. Other extremist monks like Sitagu Sayadaw have worked tirelessly to impress upon the Burmese Junta the threat posed by Muslims and the Rohingya, building a stronger symbiotic relationship between the military dictatorship and the ultranationalist clergy. This emboldened position has also led to Far-right Buddhist monks building their own militias to defend Myanmar from Muslims and other threats, including pro-democracy groups.
The persecution of the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar is another stark example of hate spin in action. The Burmese military and Buddhist nationalists have justified their actions through a narrative that mirrors global Islamophobic rhetoric.
The Rohingya are depicted as “invaders and terrorists,” a portrayal that echoes the same themes used by Islamophobic movements worldwide. This rhetoric not only legitimizes the violence against the Rohingya in the eyes of many Burmese Buddhists but also resonates with global Islamophobic narratives, further entrenching these harmful stereotypes.
The disinformation about the Rohingya crisis, often spread by saffron nationalist groups, has been instrumental in fueling global Islamophobia. This disinformation is not limited to Myanmar—it is shared and amplified by far-right groups globally, connecting and reinforcing anti-Muslim narratives across different regions.
The result is a transnational network of hate that legitimizes and sustains Islamophobia on a global scale. Evidence of this can be seen in the disinformation spread by Hindu nationalist groups in India, particularly in New Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Assam, Tripura, and West Bengal, where the presence of Rohingya Muslim refugees has been actively used to stoke fears of a “Muslim invasion.”
Disrupting the Network of Hate
Social media has played a pivotal role in amplifying hate spin and its networked legitimacy. These platforms, designed to connect people, have instead become powerful tools in the hands of far-right groups to disseminate false narratives about Muslims, creating a transnational echo chamber that reinforces their extremist views.
This enables these groups to indoctrinate and mobilize new constituencies by emphasizing the global scale of the threat matrix, creating a self-sustaining and expanding cycle of hate where the violence and hateful rhetoric of one group, reinforces the beliefs and actions of others, emphasizing the need to act, therefore perpetuating the cycle. However, networked legitimacy can also be harnessed for positive transnational cooperation to combat hate and promote inclusivity.
To truly disrupt the seemingly endless cycle of radicalization and violence, it is essential to foster greater collaboration among governments, tech companies, civil society and the greater public sphere. This includes sharing intelligence, coordinating counter-narratives, and empowering bottom-up initiatives while implementing stricter laws and regulations to combat online hate. Only through greater collaboration, can we forge counter-narratives capable of dismantling the networks of hate that sustain global Islamophobia and more broadly, far-right extremism.
(Pravin Prakash is a Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Organized Hate’s Violence, Extremism, and Radicalization Program.)